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dimitry Kochenov*
on poLICInG ARtICLe 2 teu CoMpLIAnCe 
– ReveRse SOlaNGE AnD sYsteMIC 
InFRInGeMents AnALYZeD
IntRoDuCtIon
This article aims to provide a systemic critical analysis of the two most detailed 
proposals currently available in the academic literature to solve the crisis of the rule 
of Law plaguing the Union.1 The focus is on the reverse Solange proposal by Armin 
von Bogdandy et al.2 and on the systemic infringement proposal by Kim Lane Schep-
pele.3 It also touches upon Jan-Werner Müller’s Copenhagen Commission idea,4 
which is not included in the analysis as a separate Part in its own right only due to the 
fact that the level of legal elaboration and detail surrounding the Copenhagen Com-
mission proposal is less detailed, if approached with an eye toward immediate possible 
* Professor of eU Constitutional Law, University of Groningen, The Netherlands. I am grateful to 
countless colleagues with whom the key ideas expressed in this article have been discussed, especially to 
Kim Lane Scheppele and Carlos Closa Montero, as well as to Maximilian Steinbeis, who put up bits and 
pieces of the story-line contained in what follows on the verfassungsblog over the last two years, and to 
Łukasz Gruszczyński for his support and infinite patience. The research assistance of Justin Lindeboom is 
kindly acknowledged. 
1 A. von Bogdandy & P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in the european Constitutional area: 
Theory, Law and Politics in hungary and romania, Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2014; J.-W. Müller, Safeguarding 
democracy inside the eu: Brussels and the Future of the Liberal order, transatlantic Academy Paper Series, 
2013; D. Kochenov, europe’s Crisis of values, 48 revista catalana de dret públic (2014) (forthcoming).
2 A. von Bogdandy et al., reverse Solange – Protecting the essence of Fundamental rights against eu 
Member States, 49 Common Market Law review 489 (2012).
3 K.L. Scheppele, what Can the european Commission do when Member States violate Basic Principles of 
the european union? The Case for Systematic infringement actions (2013) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/
assises-justice-2013/files/contributions/45.princetonuniversityscheppelesystemicinfringementactionbrus 
selsversion_en.pdf; for the proposal in brief, see K.L. Scheppele, eu Commission v. hungary: The Case 
for the “Systemic infringement action”, Verfassungsblog, 22 November 2013, http://www.verfassungsblog.
de/en/the-eu-commission-v-hungary-the-case-for-the-systemic-infringement-action/#.Uzcje6hdUVB. For 
the discussion, see Verfassungsblog, hungary – taking action, episode 2: The Systemic infringement action, 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/category/focus/ungarn-vertragsverletzungsverfahren-scheppele/#.
UzcjsqhdUVC.
4 Müller, supra note 1.




deployment, compared to the two proposals chosen for detailed scrutiny.5 While none 
of these proposals is likely, if implemented alone, to solve the current crisis for a number 
of sound reasons analyzed in detail infra, both of them make important contributions 
worthy of most serious study and consideration. Although the Commission has now 
released its own proposals on what to do,6 it is clear that the story will not stop here: 
we are only witnessing the beginning of a long process of contemplation on how to re-
solve the outstanding issues in the current context. The crisis we are facing is extremely 
complex, calling for complex solutions, and elements of the proposals considered in this 
article will certainly make an important addition to the successful roadmap to resolve 
the problems the Union is facing.
The only point besides the need to reinforce the values’ dimension of european 
integration, which is abundantly clear with regard to the rule of Law crisis at this 
stage, is that the crisis is a test of extraordinary importance, and one which the eU will 
be facing for some time to come.7 In this context it is not surprising that so many 
proposals on how to solve it have been tabled during the recent years, besides the ones 
which this contribution will be scrutinizing in detail.8 Vice-President reding suggests 
granting the eU general human rights jurisdiction,9 Venice Commission President 
Gianni Buquicchio10 advocates entrusting the Venice Commission with the role of 
guardian of Article 2 of the treaty on european Union (teU), and many others could 
be named. yet the two proposals chosen for an in-depth analysis here are of particular 
importance as they are the most detailed, doctrinally-equipped and influential among 
all those available.
This article starts by introducing the problematic context of the crisis of the rule of 
Law in the eU, in which Article 2 teU values currently operate. Particular emphasis 
is put on taking democracy and justice into account, providing background for the 
analysis of the concrete proposals on how such a crisis can be solved (Part II). Among 
the recent proposals, two stand out due to their detailed character as well as the clear 
resonance they have produced in the literature and will be analyzed in the two Parts of 
the article which follow. The first proposal, prepared by Armin von Bogdandy, attempts 
5 For a general overview and brief assessment of all the proposals currently available in the literature, 
see C. Closa, D. Kochenov & J.H.H. Weiler, reinforcing rule of Law oversight in the european union, eUI 
Working Paper rSCAS 2014/25. For a systemic analysis, see von Bogdandy & Sonnevend, supra note 1. 
6 european Commission, A New eU Framework to Strengthen the rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 
final.
7 Kochenov, supra note 1.
8 For an overview of the academic proposals, see Closa et al., supra note 5. Also see the numerous 
discussions in the “pages” of the verfassungsblog to which a number of leading scholars contributed: 
hungary – taking action, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/category/focus/hungary-taking-action/#.Uz8 
B56h_uVO. 
9 V. reding, The eu and the rule of Law – what next?, SPeeCH/13/677, Centre for european Policy 
Studies 2013. 
10 G. Buquicchio, Speech at the “assises de la Justice conference”, european Commission, 21–22 
November 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/index_en.htm. 
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to offer a way out of the crisis through reliance on the national courts in the countries 
facing the problems. When facing a systemic breach of fundamental rights, such courts 
will then refer the issue to the european Court of Justice (eCJ) which should, accord-
ing to the proposal, extend the scope of eU law to such particular and systemic cases 
of infringement (Part III).11 The second proposal, prepared by Kim Lane Scheppele, 
adopts a radically different approach, relying instead on the european Commission’s 
power to bring infringement actions under Article 258 of the treaty on the Functioning 
of the european Union (tFeU), and proposes to open up the possibility to construe 
an actionable infringement by bundling a number of national-level developments to-
gether. each of the developments taken by itself can seem harmless, as Kim Scheppele 
rightly submits, but when considered as a whole they could produce a totally differ-
ent impression, allowing the Commission to intervene.12 Coupled with entrusting the 
Union with the possibility to subtract Article 260 tFeU fines and lump-sums from 
the eU funds destined for the Member State in breach, the second part of the proposal 
offers an economic way to enforce compliance (Part IV).
While both Armin von Bogdandy’s and Kim Scheppele’s proposals for dealing with 
the crisis of the rule of Law are of importance, as they provide valuable starting points 
in thinking about what to do at this troubling moment of eU integration history, 
neither of the two is likely to solve the crisis. 
1. tHe RuLe oF LAW CRIsIs
Besides a wave of successful eastern enlargements13 and an economic crisis which 
triggered a profound rethinking of the eurozone and the eMU as such,14 the new 
11 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 2.
12 Scheppele (what Can the european Commission do), supra note 3.
13 C. Hillion (ed.), eu enlargement: a Legal approach, Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2004; A. Ott & 
K. Inglis (eds.), handbook on european enlargement, t.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague: 2002. It has been 
persuasively suggested that following the enlargements the eU started exercising a strong legal influence in 
the neighbourhood: r. Petrov & P. Van elsuwege (eds.), Legislative approximation and application of eu 
Law in the eastern neighbourhood of the european union: towards a Common regulatory Space?, routledge, 
London: 2014; N. Ghazaryan, The european neighbourhood Policy and the democratic values of the eu, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2014. Such suggestions will probably need to be corrected somewhat following 
the russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Claims that the eU has been really effective in its nei-
ghbourhood thus stand to be somewhat corrected. For a critical account, see e.g. D. Kochenov, enP’s new 
developments: imitating Change – ignoring the Problems, 9 Comparative european Politics 581 (2011).
14 F. Amtenbrink, europe in times of economic Crisis: Bringing europe’s Citizens Closer to one another?, 
[in:] M. Dougan, N. Nic Shuibhne & e. Spaventa (eds.), empowerment and disempowerment of the 
european Citizens, Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2012, p. 171; D. Adamski, europe’s (Misguided) Constitution 
of economic Prosperity, 50 Common Market Law review 47 (2013); A.J. Menéndez, editorial: a european 
union in Constitutional Mutation?, 20 european Law Journal 125 (2014); A.J. Menéndez, whose Justice? 
which europe?, [in:] D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca & A. Williams (eds.), europe’s Justice deficit?, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford: 2014; D. Nicol, Swabian housewives, Suffering Southerners: The Contestability of Justice 
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millennium has brought about a new, previously unknown challenge to the european 
integration project: the eU’s crisis of values, which partly originated from the disregard 
of the most basic essential features of democracy and the rule of Law at the Member 
State level: “constitutional revolutions”.15 In part the crisis is due to the eU’s own weak-
ness on the values side and, in particular, its total impossibility to ensure that Article 
2 teU is more than just an empty proclamation. The crisis of the rule of Law16 is 
radically different from all the other (numerous) crises in eU history, for at least three 
reasons.17
Firstly, it has demonstrated that the assumption that the eU is and will always be 
composed of democratic Member States respecting the rule of Law and other Article 
2 teU values is unfounded – we are not shielded from a possible “Belarusisation”18 of 
the eU. 
Secondly, it has made it clear that the eU is simply non-operational in a situation 
where not all the Member States are, on the face of it, “good enough” in terms of ad-
hering to the basics of Article 2 teU. Mutual recognition, the back-bone of the eU, 
is profoundly undermined, thus paralyzing not only the future development, but also 
the day-to-day functioning of the european legal system. This follows automatically 
from the eU’s essence, no matter how you approach interdependence at the Union 
level theoretically – through the all-affected principle, as a supra-national federation, or 
through the principle of congruence.19 With a Belarus (read Hungary) in its midst, the 
eU simply cannot function successfully, since seemingly all the foundations of integra-
tion are undermined.
Thirdly, the rule of Law crisis has pushed us to realize – and this realization is actu-
ally nothing new, but is now more acute20 – that the eU has overwhelming difficul-
ties not only with policing its values procedurally, but also with supplying them with 
substantive content.21 The former is due to the weaknesses of the procedure intended, 
as exemplified by the eurozone Crisis, [in:] D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca & A. Williams (eds.), europe’s Justice 
deficit?, Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2014.
15 M. Bánkuti, G. Halmai & K.L. Scheppele, hungary’s illiberal turn: disabling the Constitution, 
23 The Journal of Democracy 138 (2012); K.L. Scheppele, The unconstitutional Constitution, New york 
times 02.01.2012; von Bogdandy & Sonnevend, supra note 1; Müller, supra note 1.
16 even the eU bodies call it such: european Union Agency for Fundamental rights (FrA), Fundamental 
rights: Challenges and achievements in 2012, FrA, Wien: 2013, pp. 22–25. On the substance of the crisis, see 
a critically important overview by A. von Bogdandy & M. Ioannidis, Systemic deficiency in the rule of Law: 
what it is, what has Been done, what Can Be done, 51 Common Market Law review 59 (2014).
17 Kochenov, supra note 1.
18 U. Belavusau, Case C-286/12 Commission v. hungary, 50 Common Market Law review 1145 (2013).
19 For a detailed analysis, see Closa et al., supra note 5. 
20 A. Williams, The ethos of europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2010; J. Neyer, The Justification 
of europe: a Political Theory of Supranational integration, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2012; G. de Búrca, 
europe’s raison d’être, [in:] D. Kochenov, F. Amtenbrink (eds.), The european union’s Shaping of the international 
Legal order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2013, p. 21; Kochenov et al. (eds.), supra note 14. 
21 On the blurred and unclear nature of what the eU actually promotes abroad when it promotes the 
rule of Law, see e.g. L. Pech, Promoting the rule of Law abroad: on the eu’s Limited Contribution to the 
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specifically, to police the values, as set forth in Article 7 teU.22 The latter, which is 
much more problematic, concerns the questionable justice credentials of the Union 
itself, which seems to stand for little more than the Internal Market for the sake of the 
Internal Market at the moment.23 A market which stands alone, without a mantle of 
ideals,24 cannot – to paraphrase J.H.H. Weiler – aspire to a constitutionalising role, 
however important the role it plays.25 In other words, following Andrew Williams’ ethos 
of europe,26 we are probably witnessing something akin to a justice deficit in europe, 
which the on-going crisis exemplifies.27
Put differently, it is abundantly clear at the moment that the crisis of values – of 
which the rule of Law crisis is the most troublesome component – is not a mere mat-
ter of concern caused by problematic national-level developments in some countries. 
Its eU-level component is equally as strong and cannot be ignored.28 Crucially in this 
regard, the eU cannot possibly pretend that it is in the position of solving the rule of 
Law crisis without a profound rethinking of how values are reflected at the suprana-
tional plane. J.H.H. Weiler is absolutely right: growing eU involvement might amount 
to nothing else but “throwing rocks in a glass-house”,29 thus aggravating the crisis rather 
than solving it. Without any doubt, all the constitutional delicacy is required at this 
point – something that the european Commission seems to be willing to demon-
strate.30
1.1. The general context in which eu values operate
In truth, the “values on which the Union is built” are illusory in a number of 
respects. The famed Article 2 teU has arguably never been intended to leave the 
world of high ideas to land on a prettore’s desk. Law and non-law at the same time, 
it is a beautiful declaration, both righteous and self-congratulatory – indeed, these 
are the values of our Union! – and destined for foreign consumption: look at our 
Shaping of an international understanding of the rule of Law, [in:] Kochenov & Amtenbrink (eds.), supra 
note 20, p. 108.
22 W. Sadurski, adding Bite to a Bark: The Story of article 7, eu enlargement, and Jörg haider, 16 
Columbia Journal of european Law 385 (2010).
23 But see D. Kochenov, The Citizenship Paradigm, 15 Cambridge yearbook of european Law and 
Policy 196 (2013) (for an optimistic account).
24 J.H.H. Weiler, Bread and Circus: The State of the european union, 4 Columbia Journal of european 
Law 223 (1998), p. 231.
25 N. Nic Shuibhne, The resilience of eu Market Citizenship, 47 Common Market Law review 1597 
(2010).
26 Williams, supra note 20; A. Williams, taking values Seriously: towards a Philosophy of eu Law, 29 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 549 (2009); D. Kochenov, The issue of values, [in:] Petrov& Van elsuwege, 
supra note 13, p. 46.
27 Kochenov et al., supra note 14. 
28 J.H.H. Weiler, on the distinction between values and virtues in the Process of european integration 
(unpublished).
29 Closa et al., supra note 5.
30 european Commission, supra note 6.
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values!31 But with several Member States presumably failing,32 everything points in 
one direction: Sir Isaiah Berlin and numerous other thinkers doubting the inherent 
kindness and reason of mankind were probably right:33 human nature might be better 
described in the Lord of the Flies34 than in a dream of Communism inevitable.35 Most 
importantly, unlike what many wished to believe, being part of the eU does not make 
a state immune from the potential problems all states face.36
Since “people are not angels”,37 they create institutions to be protected from them-
selves38 – from extreme passions,39 from natural fallacies,40 emotions,41 biases,42 from 
extreme violence,43 and from extreme “democracy”.44 Indeed, the eU has traditionally 
been viewed as one of the most effective among such protections – a radical elitist proj-
ect par excellence.45 The Union created a broad and appealing programme of suprana-
tional restraint of the States in relation to each-other,46 also showing to the world that a 
different way of sharing a small continent is possible.47
31 S. Lucarelli, values, Principles, identity and european union Foreign Policy, [in:] S. Lucarelli & I. 
Manners (eds.), values and Principles in european union Foreign Policy, routledge, London: 2006, p. 1; 
M. Cremona, values in eu Foreign Policy, [in:] M. evans & P. Koutrakos (ed.), Beyond the established 
Legal orders: Policy interconnections between the eu and the rest of the world, Hart Publishing, Oxford: 
2011, p. 275; e. Herlin-Karnell, eu values and the Shaping of the international Context, [in:] Kochenov & 
Amtenbrink (eds.), supra note 20, p. 89.
32 Müller, supra note 1, von Bogdandy & Sonnevend, supra note 1.
33 I. Berlin, two Concepts of Liberty (1958), [in:] I. Berlin, Four essays on Liberty, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford: 1969, p. 1.
34 W. Golding, The Lord of the Flies, Faber & Faber, London: 1954.
35 e.L. tuvelson, The Millenarian Structure of The Communist Manifesto, [in:] C.A. Patrides & J. 
Wittreich (eds.), The apocalypse: in english renaissance Thought and Literature, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca: 1984, p. 339.
36 Kochenov, supra note 26.
37 Publius (J. Madison), Federalist no. 51.
38 A. Sajó, Limiting Government: an introduction to Constitutionalism, CeU Press, Budapest: 1999.
39 I.P. Couliano, eros and Magic in the renaissance, University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1987. 
40 M.J. Lerner & S. Claton, Justice and Self-interest, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2011; D. 
Kochenov, The Just world, [in:] Kochenov et al. (eds.), supra note 14.
41 A. Sajó, Constitutional Sentiments, yale University Press, New Haven: 2011.
42 C. Sustein, designing democracy: what Constitutions do, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2001.
43 S. roy, Justice as europe’s Signifier: towards a More inclusive hermeneutics of the european Constitutional 
order, [in:] Kochenov et al. (eds.), supra note 14.
44 M. Kumm, The idea of Socratic Contestation and the right to Justification: The Point of rights-Based 
Proportionality review, 4 Law & ethics of Human rights 141 (2010).
45 W. Kymlicka, Liberal nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice, [in:] S. Benhabib, another 
Cosmopolitanism, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2006, p. 128, 134. See also G. Davies, The humiliation 
of the State as a Constitutional tactic, [in:] F. Amtenbrink & P.A.J. van den Bergh (eds.), The Constitutional 
integrity of the european union, t.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague: 2010, p. 147.
46 P. Allott, The european Community is not the true european Community, 100 yale Law Journal 
2485 (1991) (see especially, his diplomacy–democracy distinction). See also D. Kochenov, F. Amtenbrink, 
introduction: The active Paradigm of the Study of the eu’s Place in the world, [in:] Kochenov & Amtenbrink, 
supra note 20, p. 1.
47 de Búrca, supra note 20, p. 21. 
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Based on the free choice of the participating states (certainly not the peoples, espe-
cially initially48), the Union has recently proclaimed all things nice in Article 2 teU, 
with no legal enforcement mechanism sensu stricto.49 Now the Union is coming to 
realize that this is probably not enough; which is the reason behind the emerging line 
of thinking about turning Article 2 teU – a bunch of solemn proclamations –into 
something more akin to black-letter law. 
1.2. The “problem” with democracy
In doing this however, a lot of caution is required. It is unquestionable that treat-
ing Article 2 teU as black-letter law will “invite ever more adventurous challenges to 
different national rules”, to agree with Jan Komárek.50 In fact, it would amount to 
prohibiting a wide range of democratically viable choices at the national level, effec-
tively barring the Member States from making serious (even fatal) mistakes – or at least 
from moving in that direction – mistakes which could be characterized as such in light 
of the prevalent understandings in eU law and constitutional and democratic theory 
today.51
While this “attack on democracy” as such can be legitimately criticized – as has been 
done, for instance, by Floris de Witte52 – the ethical starting point for any such criti-
cism (which as such is tactically very sound) could be regarded as deeply problematic: 
the glorification of democracy should not lead to suffering. Following J.H.H. Weiler, 
Philippe Van Parijs, and numerous others,53 glorifying democracy beyond its purely 
instrumental function in building what we would consider a good society is prob-
ably not a valid starting point54 – especially in the context of the eU.55 In addition it 
48 J.H.H. Weiler, The State “über alles”: demos, telos and the German Maastricht decision, [in:] O. Due, 
M. Lutter & J. Schwarze (eds.), Festschrift für ulrich everling, Bd. 2, Nomos, Baden-Baden: 1995, p. 1651. 
For an argument for a legally-accepted way of referring to eU citizens as a “european nation”, see A. Jakab, 
european Constitutional Language (unpublished book manuscript).
49 Art. 7 treaty on european Union is not really a legal, but a political procedure.
50 J. Komárek, The eu is More Than a Constraint on Populist democracy, verfassungsblog, 25.03.2013, 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/the-eu-is-more-than-a-constraint-on-populist-democracy/#.
UzasOqhdUVA.
51 On why moving in such direction might be necessary, see A. Badiou, ethics: an essay on the 
understanding of evil, Verso, New york: 2001.
52 F. de Witte, Less Constraint of Popular democracy, More empowerment of Citizens, verfassungsblog, 
22.03.2013, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/less-constraint-of-popular-democracy-more-empower-
ment-of-citizens/#.UzatMqhdUVA. 
53 e.g. J.H.H. Weiler, in defence of the Status Quo: europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg, [in:] J.H.H. 
Weiler & M. Wind (eds.), european Constitutionalism beyond the State, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge: 2003, pp. 7, 18: “a democracy of vile persons will be vile”; P. Van Parijs, Just democracy: The 
rawls and Machiavelli Programme, eCPr, Colchester: 2012.
54 On this specific point, see in particular J. Mueller, democracy and ralph’s Pretty Good Grocery: 
elections, equality, and the Minimal human Being, 36 American Journal of Political Science 983 (1992).
55 Neyer, supra note 20; J. Neyer, Justice and the right to Justification: Conceptual reflections, [in:] 
Kochenov et al. (eds.), supra note 14. But see r. Forst, Justice, democracy and the right to Justification, [in:] 
Kochenov et al. (eds.), supra note 14.
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does not fly historically. As has already been recalled, the eU’s origins and goals are 
clearly anti-Statist to a great degree56 and to pretend that the discovery that such is 
the case should cause surprise would be unsound in the light of the whole history of 
the european project’s development. Supranationalism is about taming the beast of 
nationalism – and the story of the creation and enforcement of supranational law is of 
crucial importance here. Indeed, to quote Judge Lenaerts in one convincing example, 
“the infringement procedure is a distinctive mark of [eU] law, which makes it different 
from international law.”57
Viewed in this light, the idea of making Article 2 teU enforceable law could be re-
garded as a legitimate – if not predestined and indispensable – next step in the evolution 
of the european project. That the thinking in this direction is nothing new is confirmed 
by the very texts of the treaties – besides the function of Article 7 teU (leaving aside 
its procedure for the moment), the very story of the Member States’ courts bullying 
the eCJ to ensure that the eU moves into human rights protection,58 the rule of Law 
etc.59 on which the very notion of direct effect and supremacy of eU law was clearly 
made dependent, is a clear reminder of what is new and what is not. In light of all this, 
although we know that Article 2 teU, when applied as black-letter law, will diminish 
national democratic space, this is a good thing rather than a bad thing, which flows 
naturally from all the history and the very purpose of eU integration. Having said that, 
procedural guarantees have to be put in place to ensure that Article 2 teU does not 
become a pretext to ruin eU federalism60 by allowing the eU to randomly overstep the 
scope of the powers delegated to it.61
1.3. A word for justice
Before turning to the detailed analysis of the proposals in question, one more gen-
eral remark is apt: while both proposals are of great importance and contain a number 
of potentially usable elements, the Devil, here at least, is not in the details. The key 
56 Davies, supra note 45. 
57 K. Lenaerts, The rule of Law and Coherence of the Judicial System of the european union, 44 Common 
Market Law review 1639 (2007).
58 B. de Witte, The Past and Future role of the european Court of Justice in the Protection of human 
rights, [in:] P. Alston (ed.), The eu and human rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1999, p. 859.
59 B. Davies, resisting the european Court of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2012.
60 On eU federalism, see especially K. Lenaerts & K. Gutman, “Federal Common Law” in the europe-
an union: a Comparative Perspective from the united States, 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 1 
(2006); r. Schütze, on “Federal” Ground: The european union as an (inter)national Phenomenon, 46 
Common Market Law review 1069 (2009); J.-C. Piris, L’union européenne: vers une nouvelle forme de 
fédéralisme?, 41 revue trimestrielle de droit européen 243 (2005); D. Sidjanski, actualité et dynamique du 
fédéralisme européen, No. 341 revue du marché communautaire 655 (1990). Judge Pierre Pescatore has 
been pointing out the “caractère fédérale de la constitution européenne” even before the formulation of 
the principle of supremacy by the european Court of Justice: P. Pescatore, La Cour en tant que jurisdiction 
fédérale et constitutionnelle, [in:] dix ans de jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes: 
Congrès européen Cologne, du 24 au 26 avril 1963, Heymanns Verlag, Köln: 1963, p. 522.
61 Closa et al., supra note 5: Weiler’s contribution, p. 25. 
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weakness of both proposals lies in the attempt which they make to confine the under-
standing (and, consequently, the solution) of the crisis to the national level, presenting 
the main problem which the eU is facing in the context of the rule of Law and other 
values as expressed in Article 2 teU as a problem belonging to the national level. yet 
– and this is fundamentally important – the crisis is particularly acute because of the 
eU’s own inability – supranationally – to provide a substantive take on what Article 2 
teU actually requires. The crisis thus stretches far beyond the non-compliance by some 
of the Member States with the general values provisions in the treaties. It also exempli-
fies the justice void, mentioned above, from which the eu suffers.
A successful development of european constitutionalism should thus necessarily take 
justice, most broadly conceived, into account.62 In other words, a successful approach 
to dealing with the current crisis of eU values will necessarily have two components: a 
supranational component, focusing on the substance of the values underpinning the supra-
national legal system; and a national component sensu stricto, which will then be confined 
to ensuring that none of the Member States drifts away from the basic principles and 
values underlying the common project. Thinking strategically, the urgency of the crisis of 
the rule of Law definitely requires tackling the latter first, no question about that. yet, the 
former, supranational aspect of the story also has to be taken into account, should we have 
a mid- to long-term perspective in mind. The analysis that follows, which focuses on the 
most concrete details dealing with the Member States’ deficiencies should thus not be read 
as ignoring, let alone dismissing, the importance of the eU-level justice issues. 
2. ReveRse SOlaNGE
In a nutshell, reverse Solange consists of applying the logic utilised by the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht in the famous line of cases where it pushed the eU (acting together 
with Corte Costituzionale) to establish a system of human rights protection at the su-
pranational level. Under the proposal, while there is a general presumption of compli-
ance of the Member States with the values outlined in Article 2 teU, in some truly ex-
ceptional cases (when a Member State ignores a judgment of the eCtHr, for instance) 
this presumption can be reversed, bringing about a possibility for the eU – via the eCJ 
– to intervene. Although the eU does not have a general values-competence, the eCJ 
is invited de facto to police the values (in cooperation with the national courts of the 
troubled Member States sending preliminary references) as long as the Member State in 
question cannot do it itself. Just like Solange was, reverse Solange would thus amount 
to a threat of intervention, which is to bring about compliance.
* * *
Armin von Bogdandy’s proposal, focusing on inter-court cooperation and aimed at 
blocking the systemic infringements of rights by the Member States’ authorities within 
62 Kochenov et al. (eds.), supra note 14.
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their scope of competence through extending the scope of eU law to cover extraordi-
nary cases, provides a rich soil for critical engagement. While the general line of argu-
ment in the proposal is potentially promising, it is submitted here that the proposal 
is probably not as innovative and not as practical as its authors suggest. Crucially, it 
comes across as an almost purely theoretical complex of suggestions, not yet ready for 
practical deployment. This is the fundamental difference between it and Kim Schep-
pele’s proposal (analyzed in the next Part), which is clearly designed having practical 
deployment in mind. Armin von Bogdandy’s proposal, its decipherable theoretical bias 
notwithstanding, is an important starting point for further scrutiny of the evolution 
of the interrelation between eU citizenship, fundamental rights, and the division of 
competences between the eU and the Member States.63
The analysis contained in this Part adopts as a starting point an approach to eU 
federalism (to use the term in the vein of robert Schütze,64 putting our simple human 
needs, joys, and fears above the self-contained aspirations) radically different from 
the one which would be expected in the context of Begriffsjurisprudenz, which starts 
with the concept and proceeds to fit the richness of the world to it, rather than taking 
the individual as such as a starting point. In this context it is impossible not to share 
von Bogdandy’s view that “[c]itizenship and fundamental rights are […] two mutu-
ally strengthening concepts which essentially pursue the very same objective, i.e. to 
bring the Union closer to the individual.”65 Such an approach provides a solid starting 
point for the analysis of the potential of eU citizenship to interact with fundamental 
rights.
2.1. eu citizenship in the centre of the picture
The proposal takes infringements of rights as a starting point, opening an opportu-
nity for eU citizens, in cases when the Member States fail systemically, to allege a viola-
tion of rights with a potential eU significance, as it were, hoping that the local court to 
which such distressed citizens turn would refer a question to the Court of Justice over 
the potential systemic breach. This part of the proposal does not seem to contain much 
innovation, as the proposal seems to be potentially more restrictive than the actual eU 
citizenship case-law of the eCJ.66
63 M. van den Brink, eu Citizenship and eu Fundamental rights: taking eu Citizenship rights 
Seriously, 39 Legal Issues of economic Integration 273 (2012); D. Kochenov, The right to have What 
rights? eu Citizenship in need of Clarification, 19 european Law Journal 502 (2013).
64 r. Schütze, From dual to Cooperative Federalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2010.
65 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 2, p. 506.
66 K. Lenaerts, “Civis europaeus sum”: From the Cross-border Link to the Status of Citizen of the 
union, 3 Online Journal on the Free Movement of Workers 6 (2011), especially p. 18; D. Kochenov, 
a real european Citizenship; a new Jurisdiction test; a novel Chapter in the development of the union 
in europe, 18 Columbia Journal of european Law 56 (2011). For an over-arching analysis for eU 
citizenship’s potential to facilitate the enlargement of the scope of eU law, see D. Kochenov (ed.), 
eu Citizenship and Federalism: The role of rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2015 
(forthcoming).
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In a consistent line of case-law, the eCJ has by now formulated a second jurisdiction 
test, which is an alternative to the classic cross-border situation approach.67 This new test, 
first hinted at in rottmann,68 developed in ruiz Zambrano,69 and reconfirmed in McCar-
thy,70 dereçi71 and o, S and L72 is essentially constructed around a logic identical to that 
of the von Bogdandy proposal, with one crucial difference: while von Bogdandy requires 
an overwhelmingly high threshold of a fundamental disruption of rights (such as a refusal 
to abide by a final judgment of the european Court of Human rights, for instance)73 to 
be met, the eCJ actually places the threshold required for eU law intervention infinitely 
lower. The test is the “deprivation of the essence of rights”74 of eU citizenship.75 The in-
fringement of some essential rights of eU citizens can activate eU law much easier than 
what von Bogdandy proposes, without any innovations required.76 In other words, part 
of what is proposed is not a likely revolution-to-come, but an already important part of 
67 Kochenov (a real european Citizenship), supra note 66; S. Iglesias Sánchez, ¿hacia una nueva 
relación entre la nacionalidad estatal y la cuidadanía europea?, 37 revista de derecho comunitario europeo 
933 (2010).
68 Case C-135/08 Janko rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] eCr I-1449. See also D. Kochenov, 
annotation, Case C-135/08, Janko rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 47 Common Market Law review 1831 
(2010); G.-r. de Groot, overwegingen over de Janko rottmann-beslissing van het europese hof van Justitie, 
Asiel & Migrantenrecht 293 (2010); G.N. von toggenburg, Zur unionsbürgerschaft: inwieweit entzieht sich 
ihr entzug der unionskontrolle?, european Law reporter 165 (2010).
69 Case C-34/09 ruiz Zambrano v. office national de l’emploi [2011] eCr I-1177. See also L. Ankersmit 
& W. Geursen, ruiz Zambrano: de interne situatie voorbij, Asiel- & Migrantenrecht 156 (2011); P. Van 
elsuwege, Shifting Boundaries?: european union Citizenship and the Scope of application of eu Law, 38 
Legal Issues of economic Integration 263 (2011); K. Hailbronner & D. Thym, annotation, Case C-34/09, 
Gerardo ruiz Zambrano v. office national de l’emploi, 48 Common Market Law review 1253 (2011); M. 
Olivas & D. Kochenov, Case C-34/09 ruiz Zambrano: a respectful rejoinder, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Series Paper 2012/W/1, Olivas: Houston Law Centre, texas.
70 Case C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the home department [2011] eCr I-3375. 
See also P. Van elsuwege, annotation, Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the home 
department: european union Citizenship and the Purely internal rule revisited, 7 european Constitutional 
Law review 308 (2011); P. Van elsuwege & D. Kochenov, on the Limits of Judicial intervention: eu 
Citizenship and Family reunification rights, 13 european Journal of Migration & Law 443 (2011).
71 Case C-256/11 Murat dereci and others v. Bundesministerium für inneres [2011] eCr I-11315. See 
also S. Adam & P. Van elsuwege, Citizenship rights and the Federal Balance between the european union and 
its Member States: Comment on dereci, 37 european Law review 176 (2012); N. Nic Shuibhne, annotation 
of Case C-434/09 McCarthy and Case C-256/11 dereci, 49 Common Market Law review 349 (2012).
72 Cases C-356 and 357/11 o. and S. v. Maahanmuuttovirasto and Maahanmuuttovirasto v. L. [2012] 
eCr nyr.
73 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 2, p. 513.
74 Case C-34/09 ruiz Zambrano v. office national de l’emploi [2011] eCr I-1177, para. 42.
75 For an analysis of the problems stemming from the eCJ’s approach, see Kochenov, supra note 63. For 
an analysis of the history of the doctrine of the deprivation of the essence of rights, see M. van den Brink, 
The origins of the doctrine of the deprivation of the essence of rights, [in:] Kochenov (ed.), eu Citizenship 
and Federalism, supra note 66.
76 For the history behind this understanding of eU citizenship, see D. Kochenov & r. Plender, eu 
Citizenship: From an incipient Form to an incipient Substance? The discovery of the treaty text, 37 european 
Law review 369 (2012).
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the day-to-day reality in the european Union. What the proposal comes down to then is 
to give this new reality a doctrinal face and, also, to polish the rules of the application of 
the new jurisdiction test, which are far from clear at the moment.77
Following the recent case-law, it is possible to state with certainty that the law has 
undoubtedly moved past the point of “cross-border” orthodoxies;78 that there are two 
jurisdiction tests used by the Court side-by-side has emerged in all clarity several years 
ago.79 Judge Lenaerts also confirmed the existence of the second, purely rights-based, 
jurisdiction test for the Court.80 The very contemporary legal reality in the eU thus 
shields von Bogdandy’s proposal from any possible criticism with respect to its starting 
assumptions, while demonstrating at the same time that it is probably not as innovative 
as some scholars seem to believe, as it is fully grounded in a currently established line 
of case-law. The latter fact undoubtedly reinforces the proposal’s appeal. Moving to the 
doctrinal essence of the proposed innovation, at least six criticisms of the proposal can 
be outlined. These will be approached one by one.
2.2. Why is Solange worth copying?
Firstly, the proposal is essentially based on the assumption that Solange81 is an ex-
ample worth copying. This seems to imply that Solange actually functioned in practice, 
improving the level of human rights protection in the eU (and also in Germany, of 
course). While this is presumably self-evident for some lawyers, for others, such as my-
self, no such examples seem to be anywhere in sight. Approached in a purely practical 
vein, the truth seems to be that rather than directly improving the level of human rights 
protection, Solange-style thinking allows national courts to save face when they need to 
give in when faced with the growing importance of supranational courts.
Acting by proxy through instigating a change in approaches to human rights at a 
supranational level is, admittedly, a different matter. The possible argument that Solange 
helped to create an environment of legal pluralism is shaky. to agree with Gareth 
77 For an analysis of the numerous problems, see, Kochenov, supra note 63.
78 For a detailed lament concerning how and why such orthodoxies do not actually work, see D. 
Kochenov, Citizenship without respect: The eu’s troubled equality ideal, Jean Monnet Working Paper 08/10 
(2010). For the most fundamental treatment of this issue, see A. tryfonidou, reverse discrimination in eC 
Law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2009. See also, inter alia, N. Nic Shuibhne, Free Movement of 
Persons and the wholly internal rule: time to Move on?, 39 Common Market Law review 731 (2002).
79 Kochenov (a real european Citizenship), supra note 66.
80 Lenaerts, supra note 66, pp. 17–18: “link with eU citizenship may exist in the absence of a cross-
border element”.
81 BVerfGe 37, 271 (1974); BVerfGe 73, 378 (1986); BVerfGe 89, 155 (1993). For analysis, 
see e.g. Weiler, supra note 48; M. Herdegen, Maastricht decision and the German Constitutional Court: 
Constitutional restraints from an “ever Closer union”, 31 Common Market Law review 235 (1994). See 
also BVerfGe 63, 2267 (2009). For analysis, see e.g. D. Thym, in the name of Sovereign Statehood: a Critical 
introduction to the Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court, 46 Common Market Law review 
1795 (2009); C. Wohlfahrt, The Lisbon Case: a Critical Summary, 10 German Law Journal 1277 (2009); 
A. Steinbach, The Lisbon Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court – new Guidance on the Limits 
of european integration?, 11 German Law Journal 367 (2010).
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Davies, “where there are multiple sources of apparently constitutional law one always 
takes precedence and the other is no longer constitutional.”82 As a consequence, such 
pluralism “is an empty idea.”83 to also agree with J.H.H. Weiler, while ulterior motives 
should not play an essential role in the legal discourse – “While Jacob and rachel may 
make love for sheer carnal pleasure…” – the outcomes most certainly do – “they will 
not necessarily be bad parents for the eventual offspring.”84 While the intention of the 
eCJ in going for human rights could be to shield itself from the attacks of the national 
courts where Solange played a rhetorical role, the result was, undoubtedly, the birth of 
the eU as a human rights organization,85 in the hands of the eCJ,86 increasing the level 
of protection of individual citizens. What Solange-minded national courts do, never 
mind their intentions, amounts, largely, to giving up power. Consequently, it is possible 
to suggest that Solange is probably not the best graft to transplant: its practical useful-
ness in terms of actually increasing the level of human rights protection at the legal level 
where it emerged can be contested.
2.3. Giving up authority is not the same as claiming power
Secondly, invoking Solange comparisons is probably misleading also due to the fact 
that the whole context of drawing minimal level of protection lines changes entirely 
once one moves from the national to the supranational level of legal authority. While 
the main obligation of the BVerfG has always been, undoubtedly, to defend the Basic 
Law and human rights outlined therein, the eCJ has never had a general human rights 
jurisdiction.87 Consequently, the employment of the Solange approach by the eCJ 
comes down to – de facto at least – claiming new power.88 Such a claim will then hap-
pen without an explicit authorization, thus potentially contradicting the spirit and the 
wording of Article 4(1) teU.89
It is not clear in this context why allusions to a doctrinal approach, developed in or-
der to be as convincing as possible while gently giving up authority, should necessarily 
be helpful in the context of enlarging the potential scope of legal intervention within 
82 G. Davies, Constitutional disagreement in europe and the Search for Pluralism, eric Stein Working 
Paper No. 1/2010, p. 3.
83 ibidem.
84 J.H.H. Weiler & N.J.S. Lockhart, “taking rights Seriously”: The european Court and its Fundamental 
rights Jurisprudence – Part i, 32 Common Market Law review 51 (1995), p. 71.
85 Alston (ed.), supra note 58. 
86 de Witte, supra note 58, p. 859.
87 Notwithstanding the fact that the arguments for such a policy are strong: P. Alston & J.H.H. Weiler, 
an “ever Closer union” in need of a human rights Policy, 9 european Journal of International Law 658 
(1998), pp. 688–695.
88 This is the only reason why the eCJ is extremely careful with the “substance of rights doctrine”. 
even in cases when eU citizens clearly suffer systemic injustice in the hands of their own Member State 
authorities – like in McCarthy, for instance – the eCJ is not really prepared to take their side. The values 
side of eU integration is highly problematic, but the red lines not to be crossed have traditionally been 
quite clear: Williams (taking values Seriously), supra note 26.
89 See P. Craig, ultra vires and the Foundations of Judicial review, 57 Cambridge Law Journal 63 (1998).
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the context of a different legal order. Conceptualizing the two contrarian processes 
separately would most likely be more helpful. Contradictory foundational assumptions 
seem to be at play here: the BVerfG did not need to prove that it has to protect human 
rights as stated in the Basic Law, while the legality of the eCJ’s intervention based on a 
similar claim – notwithstanding what one thinks about its desirability and justifiability 
– is bound to be broadly questioned.90 Whether the extension of the powers of the 
Court to cover Article 2 teU is a sufficient justification for such a move91 is an open 
question which can be discussed at length. What is crucial, however, is the fact that the 
whole context of such a discussion will necessarily be radically different, logically, from 
the deployment of the Solange logic by the BVerfG.
2.4. Why choose abstract over concrete?
Thirdly, to side with J.H.H. Weiler yet again, “the essential characteristic of the sys-
tem is defined by the quotidian and regular, rather than the exceptional.”92 Not every-
body has to be Schmittean:93 the exceptional, the extraordinary, although important, 
are clearly not the main aspect of the functioning of the law.94
to provide for a new approach which would allow for eU intervention only in the 
extraordinary and exceptional cases of “systemic violation”,95 which is what von Bogdandy 
suggests, seemingly stops short of actually realizing the full potential of the recent devel-
opments in the field of eU citizenship, which are quotidian, mundane, and ordinary in 
nature.96 The most pressing question which arises upon reading the proposal is: “Whom 
will this help?” Arguably, citizens have little use in the shield from the extraordinary, 
from the “failure to abide by the final judgment of the eCHr.”97 rather, there seems to 
be a need to deal with the day-to-day infractions of rights, which are often nonsensical or 
unjustifiable, especially when regarded from the perspective of eU law, but are tolerated 
at the national level for a number of reasons ranging from sovereignty-inspired thinking 
to what is referred to as the “constitutional traditions” of the Member States.98
90 There are good reasons for such contestation. See e.g. J. Bengoetxea, reasoning from Consequences 
from Luxembourg, [in:] H. Koch et al. (eds.), europe: The new Legal realism: essays in honour of hjalte 
rasmussen, Djøf, Copenhagen: 2010, p. 39.
91 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 2.
92 J.H.H. Weiler, Prologue: Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism – Some doubts, [in:] G. de Búrca & 
J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The worlds of european Constitutionalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 
2012, pp. 8, 11 (note 4).
93 C. Schmitt, Politische Theologie. vier Kapitel zur Lehre von Souveränität, Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin: 1922, 1934.
94 It is true, however, that the extraordinary can destroy the law. See e.g. A. Zwitter, The rule of Law in 
times of Crisis : a Legal Theory on the State of emergency in the Liberal democracy, 98 Archives for Philoso-
phy of Law and Social Philosophy 95 (2012).
95 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 2, p. 512 (emphasis added).
96 Kochenov (ed.) (eu Citizenship and Federalism), supra note 66.
97 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 2, p. 513.
98 For a brilliant contribution approaching eU law in this vein, e.g. as undermining the Member 
States through helping people, see Davies, supra note 45.
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Alongside the simple truth that the meta-approach will be extremely difficult to 
utilize in practice, it is submitted that it will not solve the most important problems 
which eU citizens are facing. The current constitutional context is provided by the 
general trend of constitutional development, consisting of a move, in the words of 
Moshe Cohen-eliya and Iddo Porat, from the “culture of authority” to the “culture of 
justification”.99 The main problem, which thousands of eU citizens are facing, is not 
connected to the systemic meta-violations of rights, but to a myriad of most mundane 
ones, which are not dealt with by national authorities – particularly so in the “deviant” 
Member States, like Hungary. These are caused by the attempts of the Member States 
to use recourse to their “constitutional traditions” as a pretext to avoid rationally justify-
ing their policies, which can be viewed as infringing human rights, including the rights 
(even if only partly) stemming from the eU legal order. In this sense, by opening up 
an avenue for eU citizens to contest deeply-engrained assumptions in thousands of or-
dinary cases involving the violations of rights of the most ordinary eU citizens, Article 
267 tFeU100 turned the eCJ into a powerful source of Socratic contestation, which is 
essential for democracy.101
Consequently, what is most needed to make the tandem of rights and citizenship 
more effective is thus precisely the shaping of the mundane everyday necessity to justify 
the actions of authorities in the eyes of, also, eU law, as was the case in rottmann, ruiz 
Zambrano etc. – not the drawing of some highly abstract lines in the sand, which is what 
von Bogdandy suggests. Once again, such lines were really helpful so as not to lose face 
when giving up authority in the actual Solange case – a context entirely different from 
claiming authority based on the violations of rights.
2.5. The “rebutting presumptions” problem: Who will be the judge?
Also in purely procedural terms, the idea of the exceptionality of the eU’s involve-
ment seems to be losing out compared to the approach of a quotidian engagement with 
eU citizenship rights, with no regard to cross-border situations which the Court is 
actually demonstrating in rottmann and ruiz Zambrano.102 The rebuttal of a presump-
tion of equal protection of rights,103 which is deployed by von Bogdandy as an essential 
practical element in the operation of his proposal, is unlikely to be functional in prac-
tice since in the majority of cases it will clearly be up to the national courts to judge if 
the presumption is indeed rebutted, thus de facto disqualifying the eCJ from interven-
99 M. Cohen-eliya & I. Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59 American Journal 
of Comparative Law (2011) 463. See also their monograph: M. Cohen-eliya & I. Porat, Proportionality 
and Constitutional Culture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2013. V. Perju, Proportionality and 
Freedom – an essay on Method in Constitutional Law, 1(2) Global Constitutionalism 334 (2012).
100 For a most detailed analysis, see M. Broberg & N. Fenger, Preliminary references to the european 
Court of Justice, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2014. 
101 M. Kumm, The idea of Socratic Contestation and the right to Justification: The Point of rights-Based 
Proportionality review, 4 Law and ethics of Human rights 141 (2010).
102 Kochenov (a real european Citizenship), supra note 66.
103 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 2, p. 491.
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ing. When von Bogdandy clarifies that the rebuttal of such a presumption will be the 
“basis […] to seek redress before national courts and the eCJ”,104 it is clear where eU 
citizens will actually end-up with their grievances in the majority of cases. This point 
is directly related to the first drawback of the proposal identified above: rebutting the 
presumption to justify a grab of power is essentially different from doing the same to 
give up power. Moreover, in a country failing to live up to Article 2 teU requirements, 
the court system will most likely be the first target of a corrupt government attack, with 
an eye toward destroying courts’ independence, as happened in Hungary.105 The local 
courts of such a country should thus be viewed as a potential source of the problem 
rather than a possible solution to it, themselves in need of help in terms of the rule of 
Law and independence guarantees.106
2.6. The crux of the problem: How does eu law enter the picture?
It is essential to realize that any activation of rights through the concept of citizen-
ship can be conceptually sound only if the principle of equality is safeguarded.107 The 
bitterest issues of rights’ contestation in the eU are not all related to the deprivation 
of the universally recognized basic rights – although these also arise, as the example of 
Hungary tellingly demonstrates – but to the fact that (1) essentially different contents 
of seemingly identical rights are guaranteed by the Member States and the eU at their 
respective levels, coupled with (2) a starting assumption that falling within the scope 
of the law at different levels disqualifies eU citizens from invoking anti-discrimination 
guarantees in a situation when (3) the citizens are, literally, shared by the two legal 
orders.
This is nothing else but the essence of reverse discrimination,108 which thus seri-
ously qualifies the workability of von Bogdandy’s suggested starting presumption that 
the Member States “generally safeguard the essential content of fundamental rights”,109 
which in turn undermines the proposal even further.
Not surprisingly, this problem did not arise at all in the original Solange context, 
where the rights under the Basic Law and eU Law could be legitimately compared. 
Contrary to von Bogdandy’s suggested presumption, the starting assumption behind 
reverse discrimination is the non-comparability of rights of eU citizens.110 The eCJ 
104 ibidem, p. 518.
105 For a disastrous example (when approached from the rule of Law angle), see Case C-286/12 
Commission v. hungary [2012] eCr nyr, as analyzed by K.L. Scheppele, how to evade the Constitution: The 
hungarian Constitutional Court’s decision on Judicial retirement age, Part II, verfassungsblog, 09.08.2012, 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/how-to-evade-the-constitution-the-hungarian-constitutional-courts-
decision-on-judicial-retirement-age-part-ii/#.UzceIKhdUVB. 
106 Closa et al., supra note 5.
107 Kochenov, supra note 78.
108 ibidem, pp. 43–52 (and the literature cited therein).
109 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 2, p. 508.
110 D. Kochenov, equality across the Legal orders; or voiding eu Citizenship of Content, [in:] e. Guild 
et al. (eds.), The reconceptualisation of european Citizenship, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden: 2014, p. 301.
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clearly sensed this when deciding rottmann and ruiz Zambrano. In essence, philoso-
phers concur on the fact that a presumption of equality can be as good as a presump-
tion of the lack thereof as long as meaningful deviations from the initial position are 
allowed.111 There is not a word in these cases about any cross-border logic112 simply 
because it is antithetical to the logic of citizenship, which gradually emerges in full 
harmony with the treaty text.113 Article 20 tFeU, just as Article 9 teU, is silent about 
any cross border movements. We are bound by the text of the treaty and should not 
read into Part II tFeU what was not included in it by the drafters (e.g. cross-border 
requirements), who presumably have conferred sufficient powers on the eU to ensure 
that the text of Part II tFeU is not meaningless.114
2.7. The role for the Charter of Fundamental Rights
While von Bogdandy falls back on the fundamental values of the Union in submit-
ting that there is clearly no vacuum outside the scope of Article 51(1) of the Charter,115 
which is limited to instances of the implementation of eU law, the very case-law of the 
Court which von Bogdandy uses as a starting point seems to supply an illustration of 
how ephemeral the borderline established by Article 51(1) of the Charter is.116 While 
it restricts the eU’s human rights involvement, the eCJ is willing to use unwritten 
rights and principles – such as equality in eman and Sevinger,117 or the right not to be 
forced to leave the territory of the Union in ruiz Zambrano118– in situations which are 
undoubtedly not covered by the Charter.119 The Court has clearly demonstrated that it 
does not regard the Charter as the only source of fundamental rights120 and – rightly 
so – that the Charter is not an insurmountable limiting factor on its own fundamental 
rights jurisdiction. Such developments had been predicted by, inter alia, Allard Knook 
long ago.121
111 I. Berlin, equality, 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 301 (1955–1956); D.A. Lloyd 
Thomas, equality within the Limits of reason alone, 88 Mind 538 (1979).
112 Notwithstanding the direct suggestions made by AG Poiares Maduro in his Opinion to discover 
such in Case C-135/08 rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] eCr I-144, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, 
para. 33.
113 Kochenov & Plender, supra note 76.
114 Kochenov, supra note 23.
115 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 2, pp. 509–510.
116 ibidem (for a detailed analysis).
117 Case C-300/04 eman and Sevinger v. College van burgemeester en wethouders van den haag [2006] 
eCr I-8055, para. 71; D. Kochenov, eu Citizenship in the overseas, [in:] D. Kochenov (ed.), eu Law of 
the overseas, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2011, p. 199; L.F.M. Besselink, annotation of Case 
C-145/04 Spain v. u.K., Case C-300/04 eman en Sevinger, and eCt.hr Case Sevinger and eman v. The 
netherlands, 45 Common Market Law review 787 (2008). 
118 Case C-34/09 ruiz Zambrano v. office national de l’emploi [2011] eCr I-1177, para. 44.
119 Kochenov, supra note 63.
120 van den Brink, supra note 63.
121 A. Knook, The Court, the Charter, and the vertical division of Powers in the european union, 42 
Common Market Law review 367 (2005).
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The Charter is not the only, but merely one of the documents clarifying the sub-
stance and the scope of eU-level human rights protection. Consequently, it is possible 
to argue that beyond the values of Article 2 teU there can be numerous other sources 
of inspiration guiding the Court in discovering and protecting fundamental rights out-
side the limitations imposed by Article 51(1) CFr. It is noteworthy that the Court has 
never turned to the Charter in its recent groundbreaking case-law on the scope of its 
jurisdiction in eU citizenship cases. This is not surprising however: the eCJ opened up 
the potential for rights to play the key role in activating eU law, and the Charter is lim-
ited to the scope of this very law, which means that the rights deployed by the Court to 
enlarge the scope of its own jurisdiction are bound to be non-Charter rights.122 Crucially, 
however, such non-Charter rights are not confined to Article 2 teU. The proposal’s 
emphasis on the importance of Article 2 teU, although interesting, is seemingly not 
indispensable, as the lack of references to Article 2 teU in the recent eU citizenship 
case-law seem to demonstrate. Using the rights of eU citizenship as a paradigm of 
thinking about eU law activation does not seem to require, per se, Article 2 teU fixa-
tions. This is good and bad news: eU citizenship and von Bogdandy’s proposal need 
the violations of rights, while Article 2 teU, very importantly, is not about rights only. 
One can easily imagine a regime which totally disregards Article 2 teU requirements, 
yet is attentive to safeguarding basic human rights – a situation Kim Scheppele has been 
referring to in her numerous talks about Hungary.123 In such a context the way to bring 
it in compliance with eU’s values will necessarily imply departing from the safety-net 
of human rights protection.124
3. sYsteMIC InFRInGeMent pRoCeDuRe
What Kim Scheppele proposed is, in essence, to use the existing law-enforcement 
provisions, including Articles 258 and 260 tFeU to make them ‘catch’ the cases when 
eU values are infringed through enabling the Commission: a) to bring cases against the 
Member States which fall short of complying with Article 2 teU based on a cumulative 
analysis of their operation in a number of different fields. The idea is that individual 
instances of compliance and failure to comply with eU law, when approached together, 
systemically, can produce valuable insights, forming a convincing case. Otherwise put, 
a sum can be more important than its parts, pointing in the direction of a systemic 
infringement. to ensure that the Member States found in breach comply with eCJ’s 
decisions it is proposed b) to deduct their fines and lump-sums (following the applica-
tion of Article 260 tFeU) directly from the moneys destined for the Member States in 
122 For an analysis, see Kochenov, supra note 63.
123 See e.g. Scheppele, supra note 15. For a discussion, see Verfassungsblog’s special feature Hungary, 
which originated in Professor Scheppele’s analysis: verfassungsblog, supra note 8.
124 Closa et al., supra note 5.
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question from the eU budget thereby ensuring that the Member States return into the 
realm of eU values. 
* * *
Kim Scheppele’s proposal thus adopts a radically different approach compared to 
von Bogdandy’s. First of all, it seems to be more tailored to practice, aiming to make an 
impact on the ground, with a lesser bias towards doctrinal approaches than that demon-
strated by von Bogdandy’s ‘reverse Solange’ proposal. This becomes particularly obvious 
if we make the trick (suggested in the proposal itself125) of substituting Article 2 teU 
with Article 4(3) teU, which establishes the duty of loyalty – a clearly justiciable and 
much-used principle of eU law.126 Secondly, similarly with von Bogdandy’s proposal 
what Kim Scheppele suggests is much less revolutionary than it might seem, which is 
– again just as with von Bogdandy – also a positive feature. This is particularly so if one 
has an eye on possible implementation. Unlike Vice-President reding’s suggestion to 
expand the scope of the Charter of Fundamental rights beyond what Article 51 CFr 
now allows127 or Jan-Werner Müller’s idea to create a new institution in charge of moni-
toring and enforcing Article 2 teU values,128 Scheppele’s proposal does not require a 
treaty change or the creation of new eU organs, either within or outside the treaty 
framework, and could thus potentially be deployed swiftly. Lastly, and very impor-
tantly, it is not directly dependent on the national judiciaries in the troubled Member 
States, which distinguishes it positively from what von Bogdandy suggests.
Coming from such an established voice advocating the protection of rule of Law at 
the national level, Kim Scheppele’s proposal definitely enjoys sufficient legitimacy to be 
taken very seriously. In what follows, this Part will address what is termed here as the 
“problem” with bundling infringements, the problem of determining the meaning of 
“values”, and the problem with Article 260 tFeU penalties as the main way to enforce 
the promise and the presumption of Article 2 teU. This Part demonstrates that two of 
the three “problems” are largely fictitious and thus moot, but at least one is potentially 
very real and will need to be addressed before the eventual deployment of the proposal 
in question.
All in all, given that Kim Scheppele’s idea of systemic infringement proceedings 
does not require treaty change while at the same time steering clear of supplying a 
rhetorical justification for a serious power-grab in the context of eU federalism, and 
in addition allows the Commission to act in its established capacity of the guardian 
of the treaties,129 the proposal is infinitely stronger than the one analyzed in the pre-
vious Part.
125 Scheppele (what Can the european Commission do), supra note 3, p. 5.
126 For an analysis of the different combinations of these (and related) treaty provisions in the context 
of dealing with the crisis of values, see Closa et al., supra note 5, pp. 9–10.
127 reding, supra note 9. 
128 Müller, supra note 1.
129 Art. 17(1) teU.
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3.1. The “problem” with bundling
Kim Scheppele’s proposal consists of two components. The first concerns the way 
to deploy Article 258 tFeU to ensure that the problems with living up to the values 
of Article 2 teU are effectively caught by the infringement procedure – by bundling 
infringements to allow the Commission and the Court to see the bigger picture of a sys-
temic infringement. The second component is about the modalities of the collection of 
fines and lump-sums from the Member States found to be in breach, thus “perfecting” 
the way Article 260 tFeU is used. Fining is one thing (and is also a separate procedure 
and a provision in the treaty); finding a breach is another. It thus makes sense to start 
the analysis with the suggested bundling practices proposed for determining whether 
there is a systemic breach.
How innovative will the bundling of infringements be per se? The practice is known 
to the Court and although the treaties do not contain any direct references to bundling, 
there seem to be no reasons why we should not be convinced by the reasoning of the 
eCJ in irish waste:130 “the fact that the deficiencies pointed out in one or other case have 
been remedied does not necessarily mean that the general and continuous approach of 
those authorities, to which such specific deficiencies would testify where appropriate, 
has come to an end.”131 Indeed, the whole story of the Commission’s guardianship of 
the treaties by bringing non-compliant Member States to Court is a story of seeing the 
patterns in numerous infringements and, eventually, bundling them together, as bril-
liantly analyzed by Pål Wennerås.132
Plenty of current Commission activities in the context of Article 258 tFeU de facto 
imply bundling. Whether it monitors what the Irish do with their waste for 24 years, 
breaking the law everywhere all over the country – or observes how for ten years French 
farmers attack and harass strawberry-bearing Spaniards in full sight and with the full 
complacency of the French state,133 what we are dealing with is, it seems, nothing but 
bundling of numerous tiny infringements, which allows the Commission to see the big-
ger picture. The latter then constitutes the real infringement of the law.
Importantly, however, bundling goes beyond the mere summing up of infringe-
ments – it allows discovering a new type of breach based on the reality of discovery and 
cumulation. AG Geelhoed in irish waste added an interesting aspect to the infringe-
ment story, which was picked up by the Court, stating that the cumulation as such 
can result in a finding of a different infringement.134 This does not go so far as to state 
that the cumulation of seemingly innocent practices (as could be the case in bundling 
legitimate constitutional developments which can constitute a potential breach of eU 
130 Case C-494/01 Commission v. ireland [2005] eCr I-3331.
131 ibidem, para. 32.
132 P. Wennerås, a new dawn for Commission enforcement under articles 226 and 228 eC: General 
and Persistent (Gap) infringements, Lump Sums and Penalty Payments, 43 Common Market Law review 
31 (2006).
133 Case C-265/95 Commission v. France [1997] eCr I-6959.
134 Case C-494/01 Commission v. ireland [2005] eCr I-3331, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para 19.
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values only if considered together), could produce illegal results, but the “cumulation 
trend” is clear.
The current practice of the eCJ can be interpreted as pointing in the direction of 
broadening the utilization of bundling practices in the future. Pal Wennerås, one of 
the leading legal minds in this field, suggested, based on a most meticulous analysis of 
the law, the bundling and finding of infringements based on the numerous violations 
of different instruments in one sector of the acquis,135 which would make perfect sense 
since, understood systemically, the infringement procedures in the treaties have only 
one objective: to ensure that the Member States comply with the letter and, crucially, 
with the spirit of the law, the latter coming uniquely to light when a number of concrete 
practices is analyzed. It is impossible to argue convincingly that Article 258 tFeU can 
only be utilized when one particular provision of the treaties or secondary law of the 
eU is breached. In this sense, once bundled infringements based on examples coming, 
simultaneously, from different areas of the acquis are possible, it would be only logical 
to also extend such cross-sectoral bundling in the way suggested by Kim Scheppele to 
ensure that the values of the Union are observed and safeguarded.
The innovative nature of Kim Scheppele’s proposal is thus not in bundling as such, 
but in the audacity with which the practice of bundling potentially ventures into the 
murky waters where law and policy meet and nothing is as clear as in the context of the 
straight-forward internal market acquis: the proposal suggests an important move to 
seriously upgrade the current practice. While innovative, it seems, at the same time, to 
be fully grounded in the law as interpreted by the eCJ – a logical continuation building 
on the established current practice.
3.2. Determining the exact meaning of values
Moving bundling beyond the acquis sensu stricto, to allow it with the aim of ensur-
ing compliance with Article 2 teU reveals an acute problem, which is profoundly 
ideological: who is to decide what is democracy, the rule of law etc.? This is the es-
sential problem which the eU is facing at the moment and which has been touched 
upon in the Introduction to this piece. Crucially, for an infringement of Article 2 teU 
be found directly it will be necessary, as Jan Komárek also suggested,136 to create an 
acquis on values, which does not exist.137 While the Copenhagen criteria138 and their 
progeny reflect an attempt to mould such an acquis in the context of the pre-accession 
assessment of the candidate countries,139 the practice left much to be desired – the 
135 Wennerås, supra note 132, p. 49.
136 Komárek, supra note 50.
137 e. Herlin-Karnell, eu values and the Shaping of the international Legal Context, [in:] Kochenov & 
Amtenbrink, supra note 20, p. 89; Kochenov, supra note 26.
138 Bull. eC 6-1993, point I.13.
139 For analyses, see e.g. C. Hillion, The Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny, [in:] Hillion (ed.), supra 
note 13, p. 19; D. Kochenov, Behind the Copenhagen Façade: The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen 
Political Criterion of democracy and the rule of Law, european Integration Online Papers 8(10) (2004), p. 1.
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Commission clearly demonstrated that at times it had no clue of what it was actually 
doing, especially in the medium to long-term perspective – which essentially handed us 
all the problems we are facing today.140 The myth of this exercise’s success is very puz-
zling: it has clearly been a failure, which brought Hungary and other countries highly 
problematic from the point of view of values into the Union, only pretending to solve 
the outstanding problems, thus preferring Potëmkin villages to solid constructions.141 
While there is no acquis on values, the Commission failed to shape substance behind 
Article 2 teU, which it clearly could have done – if not was supposed to do – in the 
pre-accession context.142 This provides a viable source of scepticism in thinking about 
Jan-Werner Müller’s suggestion. Can the Commission (or a Copenhagen Commission) 
do better this time around? There is no guarantee.
Allowing the Court to shape the essence of the values expressed in Article 2 teU 
by turning them into law (which is what Kim Scheppele’s proposal comes down to in 
practice) could be a viable strategy. Indeed, this is exactly what has already happened 
with one important value – namely, the protection of human rights mentioned above. 
Uniquely eCJ-made, with recourse to a number of inventive, cautious and ultimately 
convincing tools, it is now codified in a largely unworkable Charter of the Member 
States’ making, which even the Vice-President of the Commission seems to regard as an 
obstacle on the path to treating Article 2 teU seriously. In the context of the Member 
States’ and the Commission’s performance in this area, both being clearly very poor, 
the Court is probably the most reliable actor to entrust the law of values to, even if the 
Commission will likewise play a part.
While this might be desirable, some clearer connections with eU law (read the eU’s 
acquis as now understood) are seemingly required, besides the sheer desire to impose 
militant democracy on all the Member States of the Union. One of such factors could 
be an ability to demonstrate that the changes in the institutional structures and admin-
istrative and legal practices of a particular country have a strong potential to hinder the 
development of eU law, thereby activating the duty of loyalty, which can now be used 
as a self-standing instrument. A reference to values could be added, too. It is necessary 
to be acutely aware of the fact that making values a self-standing tool in the hands of 
the Commission and the Court could threaten the vital balance of powers in the context 
of european federalism.
Numerous different ways of approaching loyalty could be outlined – from outlining 
the doubts related to the functionality of the judiciary of the Member State in ques-
140 e.g. D. Kochenov, The enP Conditionality: Pre-accession Mistakes repeated, [in:] L. Delcour & e. 
toulmets (eds.), Pioneer europe? testing eu Foreign Policy in the neighbourhood, Nomos, Baden-Baden: 
2008, p. 105.
141 The enlargement as such, however, was clearly a success. For a broader picture, see e.g. M. Vachudova, 
europe undivided: democracy, Leverage and integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
2005. 
142 For criticism of the Commission’s performance, see e.g. D. Kochenov, eu enlargement and the 
Failure of Conditionality, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2008.
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tion in the context of eU law, to pointing to overtly hostile acts vis-à-vis neighbours by 
harming their citizens (which is the case with Slovakia today, for instance143). Creating 
a catalogue of possible causes of action which would be firmly in the realm of eU law 
to connect to Article 2 teU, and which would be capable of supplying indicators of 
a Member State’s failure to comply based on an array of signs, would be a most use-
ful enterprise – akin to the one in which the Dutch section of FIDe engaged in a 
search for direct effect before meester Stibbe came up with van Gend en Loos and then 
da Costa.144
3.3. The problem with penalties
The second part of the proposal – the one dealing with fines and lump-sums and 
their collection – arouses much more scepticism than the first one, which is roughly 
rooted in current practice and boasts a clear potential.
This scepticism is chiefly connected to the main assumption that is entertained in 
the proposal, namely that fining Member States and making them pay works and im-
proves compliance. Much of the existing literature seems to point to the contrary.145 So 
while “how to collect the money?” is definitely a legitimate question, it seems to have 
very little to do with the enforcement of eU values (or, indeed, eU law) in the Member 
States. Looking at the numbers of fines assessed and the results this brought about in 
terms of correcting Member State behaviour during the 20 years of operation of the 
relevant treaty provision, it is impossible not to agree with a recent study by Brian 
Jack: “[the story] clearly suggests that [eCJ’s] lump sum penalties have not had dis-
suasive effects.”146 Moreover, the number of times when the provisions have been used 
so far (14!)147 clearly points to its profound deficiency not only in design, but also in 
application (especially knowing the level of some Member States’ compliance). Indeed, 
Jack looks in the direction of Article 7 teU for possible help in this context, while all 
the proposals made to date relating to enforcement of the rule of Law in the Member 
States take as a starting point the dysfunctional nature of that specific provision,148 
which seems to be the reason why Kim Scheppele looks at fines and Armin von Bogda-
ndy at Article 267 tFeU in the first place. The fact of the matter is that both Article 7 
and fines are problematic.
143 J.-M. Arraiza, Good neighbourliness as a Limit to extraterritorial Citizenship: The Case of hungary 
and Slovakia (unpublished).
144 As reported by A. Vauchez, The transitional Politics of Judicialization: van Gend en Loos and the 
Making of eu Polity, 16 european Law Journal 1 (2010).
145 P. Wennerås, Sanctions against Member States under article 260 tFeu: alive, but not Kicking?, 49 
Common Market Law review 145 (2012); B. Jack, article 260(2) tFeu: an effective Judicial Procedure 
for the enforcement of Judgments?, 19 european Law Journal 404 (2013). In the context of international 
relations the trend is the same – sanctions rarely work: C. Portela, european union Sanctions and Foreign 
Policy, routledge, London: 2011.
146 Jack, supra note 145, p. 420.
147 ibidem.
148 Sadurski, supra note 22.
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Most importantly, given that the fines are never high enough to crush the Member 
State financially (for a very good reason),149 they will most likely not result in compli-
ance in the countries where the issue is politically sensitive – already in the context of 
the european Neighbourhood Policy the eU learned hard way that while cosmetic 
changes are for sale, one cannot buy regime change.150 What is of overwhelming rel-
evance here is that the Article 2 teU issues are the most sensitive imaginable. Fining 
a country that is having problems with democracy and the rule of Law for precisely 
this state of affairs is overwhelmingly tricky. If the problems with democracy and the 
rule of Law are real, this means that we are speaking about a country where the bridge 
between voters’ preference and the people in power is either seriously threatened or 
broken. Using Article 260 tFeU in such a context produces a picture which is quite 
different from fining a country which has been failing to transpose a directive because 
of some technical obstacles or out of sheer sloppiness. Most importantly, the costs of 
(non-)compliance are radically different in the cases of the two countries in question. 
When the cost of compliance de facto is nothing short of a regime change (i.e. switch-
ing to democracy and the rule of Law with all the accountability mechanisms, judicial 
independence, and the possibility to lose elections), no fine will work: the country will 
be paying ever increasing amounts. In this context it matters little whether the money 
is actually recovered into the budget of the Union or not – an issue which is central to 
the second part of Kim Scheppele’s proposal. The whole point of financial penalties is 
to bring about compliance, not to initiate an internal reallocation of funds within the 
eU. to quote Brian Jack again, “[t]he Court’s financial penalty clearly has not had the 
intended coercive effect.”151 The fact that fines do not actually increase compliance is 
great news though, since it means that the problem of passing secondary legislation in 
order to recover the fines into the eU budget does not even arise, making the proposal 
(its first part at least) virtually immediately deployable.
ConCLusIons
Both proposals analyzed in this article are probably less revolutionary than they 
might seem at the first glance, yet they illustrate quite clearly the variety of the solutions 
theoretically in front of the Member States and the institutions of the Union for dealing 
with the crisis of values, which is plaguing the integration exercise at the moment. Be-
sides, the two proposals unquestionably serve as vital reminders of the limitations faced 
149 Communication from the Commission [SeC(2005) 1658] (as updated).
150 N. tocci, Can the eu Promote democracy and human rights through the enP? The Case for refocusing 
on the rule of Law, [in:] M. Cremona & G. Meloni (eds.), The european neighbourhood Policy: a Framework 
for Modernisation?, eUI Working Paper LAW 2007/21, p. 29; A. Magen, The Shadow of enlargement: 
Can the european neighbourhood Policy achieve Compliance?, 12 Columbia Journal of european Law 383 
(2006).
151 For a discussion of numerous Commission v. Greece cases, see e.g. Jack, supra note 145, p. 413.
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by any initiative aiming at turning Article 2 teU into a directly enforceable provision. 
The eU federalism is at a cross-roads and should tread forward in the most delicate way 
in dealing with the challenges posed by defiant Member States like Hungary.
Given that bundling is already de facto practiced by the Commission, enriching this 
practice to include key principles and values underlying eU law seems doable. This de-
pends more on the institutions’ political will than anything else. The same theoretically 
concerns the possibilities which eU citizenship and human rights provisions open up in 
front of those local courts willing to test the limits of the scope of eU law in the context 
of the preliminary reference procedure. Given the very nature of the problems which 
the two proposals aim to tackle, however, it seems clear that entrusting the organs 
(including the judiciary) of the problematic Member States with ensuring compliance 
with Article 2 teU can exacerbate the problems rather than solve them. The proposal 
reinforcing the Commission’s role in dealing with the problematic Member States is 
thus instantly preferable.
At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that the eternal problem of whether we 
want to give a carte blanche to the Court becomes particularly acute in the context of 
the proposals at issue. While the analogy with the story of making human rights protec-
tion part of the acquis might convince some, it is perfectly imaginable that the choice 
of the Court as the actor to solve the problems which the eU and the Member States 
are facing – which is implied in both proposals in question – will necessarily be one of 
the most difficult elements to sell, should either of the two proposals ever become op-
erational. This is particularly so given the eU’s own feeble democracy credentials.152 It 
is most telling in this respect that the Commission’s own vision – albeit preliminary of 
course – of what the Union should do in the current situation does not make a strong 
effect on the eCJ at all.
The Court’s augmented role can be presented in a particularly problematic light 
given the fact that we are not speaking about the eU acquis here: what we are speaking 
about is allowing the eCJ to redesign national democracies of the Member States, pos-
sibly without, one has to add, any clear and unquestionable authorization in the trea-
ties. In an atmosphere where there is no underlying ideal of Justice in sight153 and the 
ethos of the whole enterprise is befogged beyond being decipherable at times,154 critics 
no doubt will rightly jump on this aspect of both proposals, and this notwithstanding 
the fact that Article 7 teU has been consistently criticized precisely for the seemingly 
insufficient role which it accords to the eCJ to play. 
Lastly, the emphasis on the recovery of fines and lump-sums in one of the proposals 
(the other being entirely silent on the actual enforcement) fails to demonstrate a clear 
and direct connection between financial penalties and the defence of values. Indeed, 
the whole history of eU external relations seems to illustrate quite clearly that sanctions 
152 Closa et al., supra note 5, p. 25.
153 See e.g. G. de Búrca, D. Kochenov & A. Williams (eds.), debating europe’s Justice deficit: The eu, 
Swabian housewives, rawls, and ryanair, eUI Working Paper LAW 2013/11.
154 Williams, supra note 20.
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(and in the proposal in question we are speaking about penalties of an infinitely smaller, 
negligible state) do not work. In this sense it is clear that the systemic infringement 
proposal assumes that a Member State against which the proposal is to be deployed 
is, per se, a Member State actually willing to cooperate. The same problem, alongside 
numerous others as outlined above, also arises in the context of the reverse Solange 
proposal: what if the Member State is not willing to play along with whatever the eCJ 
finds? The presumption that the problematic Member States will actually become coop-
erative Member States is most welcome due to its optimism. yet in practical terms the 
eU could very soon find – most regrettably – that such a presumption might actually 
be untenable in practice. The Greek behaviour in the context of compliance with the 
acquis and the Hungarian behaviour in the context of Article 2 teU seem to be point-
ing precisely in the direction of such untenability, which weakens the two proposals 
even further. 
A sober analysis of the alternatives demonstrates, however, that the Member States 
(via Article 7) or the Commission (via the Copenhagen criteria and their progeny) 
are likely to deliver still much worse results than either of the two proposals analyzed, 
however unworkable they might seem in practice. The eU and the compliant Member 
States find themselves in an increasingly difficult position at the moment. The two 
proposals are thus merely the starting point in a long array of developments to come, 
which will be indispensable for the successful survival of the Union as we know it in 
the face of the mounting challenges, leaning further and further away from the basic 
principles we all hold dear. 
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